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Abstract
The paper presents a methodology for the evaluation of the complexity and
computational cost of different block ciphers, in order to be independent from the
actual platforms they are implemented on. An analysis of three block ciphers se-
lected by NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryp-
tion) in 2003 - Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2 - is then provided using such
methodology. First, the structure of all ciphers is described, so as to emphasize
the different kinds of transformations required. Then, the schemes are compared
in terms of basic operations (AND, OR, shifts) for each step, in such a way to
evaluate their complexity and to provide effective guidelines regarding their imple-
mentation.
Keywords: block ciphers, cipher complexity, performance evaluation, AES.
1 Introduction
The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and En-
cryption) is an open competition for the crypto algorithms of the  century,
which aim is to select a strong portfolio of crypto algorithms that will protect
the information society (on-line bank transactions, credit cards, personal infor-
mations, e-commerce,...). In February 2003 the NESSIE project announces the
finalists: MISTY1, Camellia, Shacal-2 and AES (Rijndael) are the four selected
block ciphers [1]. The NESSIE call for primitives specified three security levels
for block ciphers: high, normal and normal-legacy [2]. MISTY1 was selected for
the normal-legacy security level, while the other three correspond to higher levels.
For this reason we decided to take into consideration only Rijndael, Camellia and
Shacal-2.
The deadline for submissions to the NESSIE project was just before NIST’s
announcement that the AES block cipher was to be Rijndael. The choice of Rijn-
dael was primarily based on its efficiency and low memory requirements. In the
same year (2000) NTT and Mitsubishi Electric jointly developed Camellia, a next-
generation symmetric-key encryption algorithm, and presented a submission state-
ment of it to NESSIE. Camellia has the same interface as AES and provides excel-
lent efficiency [3, 4]. The distinguishing characteristic is the smallest 128-bit block
cipher hardware in the world.
Shacal was submitted to NESSIE by Gemplus [5]. Shacal has two versions
(Shacal-1 and Shacal-2) depending on the hash standard SHA-1 [6] and SHA-256
used in encryption mode. Only Shacal-2 was selected by NESSIE, while SHA-256
was added in the hash functions portfolio. SHA was not designed for encryption,
however, its compression function can be used for encryption. No security flaws
have been found in Shacal-2 and its performance is quite good [2].
NESSIE primitives will be used on a variety of platforms: PCs, smart cards,
hardware, and in various other applications. Some application areas impose very
high performance requirements (hard disk encryption) and protection of high speed
communications. Performance evaluation is an essential part in determining the
practicality of a cryptographic algorithm. In fact, an algorithm that performs well
is more likely to be adopted for practical applications. The state of the art of-
fers several performance evaluations, but all of them (being based on actual har-
ware/software implementations) are strictly connected to the selected platforms.
NESSIE also provided such kind of results [7].
Aim of the paper is to present a methodology for the evaluation of the com-
plexity and computational cost of block ciphers, thus bridging the gap between
the mathematical studies and algorithms implementation. The approach, in fact,
allows complexity evaluation and effective comparison of block ciphers without
being dependent on the actual platform they are implemented on. The method
is presented for the analysis and comparison of Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2.
Section 2 briefly introduces the three algorithms. Section 3 reports detailed ex-
planation of the methodology and the application on the selected block ciphers.
The achieved results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 provides some
comparisons among the three algorithms. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Block ciphers
2.1 Rijndael
Rijndael is a iterated block cipher with a variable block length and a variable key
length          bit 	 . The number of rounds is determined by a combination
of key length and block size [8, 9]. While other block ciphers have Feistel structure
(see Camellia), it has non-Feistel structure. Rijndael is a symmetric block cipher
with a simple, elegant and easily understandable algebraic structure. It relies di-
rectly on algebraic constructs. Let 
  	 be the Galois Field defined by the
irreducible polynomial [6]          and then view the block as set of
elements of the field. The data are placed in an ﬀﬂﬁ (block length/32) array of
elements of 
  ﬃ	 [8, 9].
The algorithm consists of an initial round-key addition, the required number of
rounds and a final round. Rijndael performs encryption by an iterative transforma-
tion called the round transformation, of which inverse operation is used for decryp-
tion and the order of the round for decryption is reversed. The round transformation
is composed of three distinct invertible uniform operations: a linear mixing layer
(ShiftRows and MixColumns), a non-linear layer (SubBytes) and a key addition
layer (AddRoundKey). Specific choices for the different layers are based on ap-
plication of the wide trail strategy [8, 9], a design method to provide resistance
against linear and differential cryptanalysis.
 SubBytes is a non-linear byte substitution, operating on each of the state
bytes independently, composed by the multiplicative inverse in 
ﬂ  !	" $#
is mapped into itself 	 and a fixed affine transformation over 
ﬂ    	 ;
 ShiftRows cyclicly shifts the elements of the % '& row of the state (*) elements
to the right, where (
)
are fixed constants;
 In MixColumns the columns of the state are considered as polynomials over

ﬂ  ﬃ	 and multiplied modulo  
 
by #   
     #
to give elements
of a new    ﬁ array;
 AddRoundKey is a XOR of the key (after the scheduling) with the array.
Decryption is realized by applying reverse transformation of each round. Since
inverse cipher is similar in structure, but uses a MixColumns transformation with
another polynomial ( #    #ﬂ  #    # ) a performance degradation is
observed on 8-bit processors. Some observation by Barreto and [10] help to reduce
the performance degradation of the decryption procedure (see Section 4).
The key schedule for Rijndael is a simple expansion using XOR and cyclic
shifts and consists of two components: KeyExpansion and round key selection.
The application in the scheduling scheme of SubBytes ensures the non-linearity,
without adding much more space requirements on an 8-bit processor. KeyExpan-
sion depends on the value of 
	 (key length/32): there is a version for 	 equal to
or below 6 and a version for 
	 above 6. In both versions the first 
	 columns of
the array are filled with the cipher key. The following columns are defined recur-
sively in terms of previously defined columns. The recursion uses the bytes of the
previous column, the bytes of the column 	 positions earlier and round-constants.
For additional details, see [8, 9].
2.2 Camellia
Camellia is a next-generation symmetric-key encryption algorithm, which supports
128-bit block size and 128, 192, 256-bit key, i.e. the same interface specifications
as AES. Efficiency on both software and hardware platforms is a remarkable cha-
racteristic of Camellia in addition to its high level of security.
Camellia uses an  -round Feistel structure for    -bit key and a   -round
Feistel structure for   and   -bit keys. There is additional input/output white-
ning and every six rounds two logical functions   are used to provide
some non-regularity across rounds. The key schedule generates from secrecy key
  -bit subkeys for round function and for   functions. The  -function of
Feistel structure presents the SPN structure, where the S-function is represented by
four fixed S-boxes, used two times in every round. All of them are affine equivalent
to the inversion function in 
  	 .
Camellia decryption procedure can be done in the same way as encryption
procedure by reversing the order of subkeys, which is one of merits of Feistel
networks. In Camellia,      function layers are inserted every six rounds,
but this property is still preserved.
Camellia key schedule varies for different key sizes. The procedure can be
divided into two steps. First, derive one (or two) 128-bit key materials  (and
 ) from the original secret key  . Second, generate all round keys by rotating




 by various amounts [4, 3].
2.3 Shacal-2
Shacal-2 is an encryption algorithm based on SHA-256, which was introduced by
NIST in 2000, which is used in encryption mode. Shacal-2 is a 256-bit block
cipher defined with a 512-bit secret key. Shorter key (not shorter than 128 bit) may
be used by padding the key with zeros to a 512-bit string.
For the encryption procedure the 256-bit plaintext is put into eight 32-bit varia-
bles   (    
 	 , which are subsequently elaborate by the compression
function during 64 rounds. Each round   (    
 	 are redefined, adding
(mod    ) constants and round keys, and using four functions ( (   

)
[5, 2].
In order for Shacal-2 to be invertible the final addition with the initial value,
which occurs in hash mode for SHA-256, is omitted. As function over 
 ﬂ     	  	 
each round step is invertible in the round variables.
In all Shacal-2 documentation there is no detailed description of the decryption
procedure. Therefore, the following paragraphs present a procedure for decryption
defined by the authors of the paper.
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In Shacal-2 the key schedule expands the 512-bit key to 2048 bits: the 512-bit
key are considered as 16 32-bit words and are expanded with the function
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where  %   and    ,  

are defined through XORs, ORs and binary shifts
[2].
3 Methodology for comparison
The methodology proposed in this section provides a tool to evaluate a block cipher
performance while achieving independence from the particular platform which it
is implemented on. The core idea is to consider only the amount of relevant ope-
rations required for the implementation of the algorithms, reducing all involved
transformations to bytewise-AND and bytewise-OR, and shifts. Cost and work-
ing of communication and logical circuits depend on technological progress, and
consequently such a methodology remains valid over time and could also provide
suggestions on the best platform to implement a given cipher.
The method is presented for the numerical evaluation of the computational
complexity of Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2. In order to illustrate the methodo-
logy, details of the calculation of the computational cost of the transformations
are reported. Despite the fact that Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2 have different
structures, it is still possible to reduce these three algorithms to a set of successive
logical operations - bytewise-AND, bytewise-OR and shifts of bytes - in order to
enable effective comparison among them and to verify the effective contribution of
the methodology.
The cost of the algorithms is estimated through a ”step by step” analysis. Since
Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2 are iterated block chipers, it is possible to recon-
struct the cost of the body algorithm through the analysis of only one round. Each
round of a iterative block cipher is a function over 
ﬂ   ﬁ
	 		 '& 	 and consists
of composite transformations. As shown in the previous section, the ciphers have
different structures, but using the following scheme the implementation computa-
tional cost can be calculated:
(a) Analysis of input/output whitening (for Rijndael and Camellia);
(b) Analysis of one round;
(c) Analysis of the last round (Rijndael) or    (Camellia).
In order to reconduct all the transformations to logical operations and shifts,
we exploit the rule that a simple bitwise-XOR of  and   is equal to       . Since
negations are negligible compared to AND/OR logical operations, a bitwise-XOR
is considered as the sum of two bitwise-ANDs and one bitwise-OR. Moreover, a
circular shift operation of a 8-bit word by  position is considered as a bytewise-
OR and 8 shifts.
3.1 Rijndael
All finite fields used in the description of Rijndael have a characteristic of 2, there-
fore the addition operation is a XOR. In the algorithm there are no multiplications
of two variables in 
ﬂ    	 , but only the multiplication of a variable with a con-
stant (in MixColumns).
(a) AddRoundKey can be implemented with 8  ﬁ bytewise-ANDs and 4  ﬁ
bytewise-ORs.
(b) One round of Rijndael consists of SubBytes, but we consider substitu-
tions as table look ups and do not include them in the complexity evaluation [13] ;
ShiftRows, which consists of 3  ﬁ shifts of bytes and 3  ﬁ bytewise-ORs; Mix-
Columns (see further) and AddRoundKey. As explained in Section 2 in Mix-
Columns the columns of the state are multipliqed modulo  

 by #   





# to give elements of a new    ﬁ array. The multiplication modulo this
polynomial can be written as a circulant matrix multiplication [9]: the first new
element has calculated as follows, and similarly the others 4 ﬁ  :
 

ﬀ
#$
 
# $







The addition can be implemented with the bitwise-XOR instruction. There is still
multiplication complexity to calculate. As Rijndael authors, we consider bytes
as polynomials. The multiplication is defined modulo  









 .
Let’s see how multiplication by the value # can be implemented. The polynomial
associated with # is  . Therefore, if we multiply an element 	 
ﬂ    	 with
# , we get:
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The multiplication by # can be implemented with 8 shifts, 8 bitewise-ORs and
3 bitwise-XORs. Since all elements of 
ﬂ   	 can be written as a sum of powers
of # , the complexity of multiplication by any constant value can be calculated
easily. The multiplication by #  can be implemented as follows:
 
# 
ﬀ


 
#

It needs 8 shifts, 8 bitwise-ORs, 3 bitwise-XORs and 1 bytewise-XOR. MixCo-
lumns transformation costs for every element 4 bytewise-XORs, 6 bitwise-XORs,
2 bytewise-ORs and 16 shifts, i.e. it can be implemented with 19 ﬁ bytewise-
XORs, 8  ﬁ bytewise-ORs and 64  ﬁ shifts.
Therefore, to implement one round we need 46 ﬂﬁ bytewise-ANDs, 31  ﬁ +
12 bytewise-ORs and 64  ﬁ + 96 binary shifts, i.e for 128-bit block encryption
184 bytewise-ANDs, 136 bytewise-ORs and 352 binary shifts; for 192-bit block
encryption 276 bytewise-ANDs, 198 bytewise-ORs and 480 binary shifts; while for
256-bit block encryption 368 bytewise-ANDs, 260 bytewise-ORs and 608 binary
shifts.
(c) The last round is equal to the round transformation, but with the Mix-
Columns step removed. It can be implemented with 8 ﬁ bytewise-ANDs, 7  ﬁ
bytewise-ORs and 3  ﬁ shifts of bytes.
The number of rounds   is determined by a combination of key length and
block size. Rijndael 32  ﬁ -bit encryption uses this scheme: (a),  $   	 (b), (c).
The limitations of Rijndael are related with its inverse because the cipher and
its inverse make use of different code and/or tables and the inverse cipher can only
partially re-use the circuitry that implements the cipher. The number of operations
changes only for InvMixColumns. InvMixColumns uses a MixColumns transfor-
mation with another polynomial: #    #   #    # . The multiplication by
bigger coefficients costs much more. We describe how they can be implemented.
 
# 
ﬀ
  $# 

#

	
 
#
ﬀ
  $# 

#

#

	
 
#
ﬀ
  $# 

#


#

	
 
#
ﬀ
  $#

#


#

	
where


ﬀ










 




	 


 







	 


  




	 

   



	 

  




	   

and


ﬀ




  




	 

  







	 

  







	 

   






	 

  




	 

  




	   

Globally, InvMixColumns transformation need 134 ﬂﬁ bytewise-ANDs, 99  ﬁ
bytewise-ORs and 32  ﬁ shifts of bytes to be implemented.
This asymmetry is due to the fact that the performance of the inverse cipher
is considered to be less important than that of the cipher. In many applications of
a block cipher, the inverse cipher operation is not used. This is the case for the
calculation of Message Authentication Codes, but also when the cipher is used in
Cipher Feedback mode or Output Feedback mode [8].
Following the key scheduling algorithm for all possible values of  ﬁ and  	
(4, 6 and 8) we calculated how many bytewise-ANDs, bytewise-ORs and shifts do
they need (see Section 4). If applications need to calculate frequently the round
keys for decryption on-the-fly, their generation can be implemented in such a way
that it outputs the round keys in the right order. To do this InvKeyExpansion [9]
has to be used instead of KeyExpansion. With the proposed methodology we esti-
mated that such kind of decryption round keys calculation need the same amount
as KeyExpansion transformation with doubled shifts operations.
3.2 Camellia
Camellia was designed to provide high speed in software and hardware imple-
mentation as well as compactness of hardware chips. 32-bit integer addition and
multiplications are not used. The reason is that - as we’ve already shown in 3.1 -
multiplications need large hardware implementation requirements.
(a) Input/output whitening can be implemented with 32 bytewise-ANDs and
16 bytewise-ORs.
(b) One round of Camellia presents the Feistel structure in which half-plaintext
enter in function  , suffered XOR and it is exchanged with other half-plaintext.
The function  presents SPN-structure based on a XOR with subkey, a substitution
and a permutation. As said in 3.1, we do not consider the S-box. XOR can be
implemented with 8 bytewise-XORs and permutations with 36 bytewise-XORs.
The global estimate is 104 bytewise-ANDs and 52 bytewise-ORs.
(c) Both  and   work on a half-plaintext. In their structures are present
bytewise-ANDs, bytewise-ORs, bytewise-XORs and rotations to the left or to the
right by one bit. The total amount is 40 bytewise-ANDs, 32 bytewise-ORs and 8
shifts of bytes.
Camellia 128-bit encryption with 128-bit key follows this scheme: (a), 6(b),
(c), 6(b), (c), 6(b), (a); with 192 or 256-bit key: (a), 6(b), (c), 6(b), (c), 6(b), (c),
6(b), (a).
The first step of scheduling for the key (see Section 2.2) is very similar to the
algorithm but the number of rounds is changed and subkeys are fixed constants.
For 128-bit key it follows the scheme (a), 2(b), (a), 2(b), while for 192 or 256-bit
key (a), 2(b), (a), 2(b), (a), 2(b). On-the-fly subkey generation is computable in the
same way in both encryption and decryption.
3.3 Shacal-2
Shacal-2 consists only of 64 round steps. No input/output addition is required.
64(b) is its corresponding scheme.
(b) One round of Shacal-2 consists of 7 additions in 
ﬂ    	  . The amount
of basic operations needed for such addition strictly depends on the 32-bit adder
architecture which is implemented with. There are existing technologies charac-
terized by different levels of complexity and performance. On the contrary, the
number of logical ANDs and ORs normally required with a parallel addition of
 bit is that of  full adders [15]. Since the aim of this work is to introduce a
platform-independent methodology (see Section 1), we decided not to decompose
the addition modulo    but to present their number in separate tables.
For each involved function the amount of basic operations is: 16 bytewise-
ANDs and 4 bytewise-ORs for (  ; 28 bytewise-ANDs and 8 bytewise-ORs for
$ ; 16 bytewise-ANDs, 20 bytewise-ORs and 96 binary shifts for 

; 16 byte-
wise-ANDs, 20 bytewise-ORs and 96 binary shifts for 

.
Therefore, the total estimate for one round is 76 bytewise-ANDs, 52 bytewise-
ORs, 24 shifts of bytes and 7 32-bit additions.
Regarding Shacal-2 decryption, the formulation that we have proposed in Sec-
tion 2.3 stresses that compared to the encryption procedure the only difference is
the amount of 32-bit additions. To work out the opposite in 
ﬂ   	  an addition
over the finite field is required. Therefore, one round of Shacal-2 decryption can
be implemented with 76 bytewise-ANDs, 52 bytewise-ORs, 24 shifts of bytes and
10 32-bit additions.
The scheduling of 256-bit key is based on 48 times iterated function (see Sec-
tion 2.3). Each round consists of 3 addition modulo    and both    and  

trans-
formations, which can be implemented with of 32 bytewise-ANDs, 32 bytewise-
ORs and 141 binary shifts.
4 Complexity evaluation
This Section provides the evaluation of the complexity of Rijndael, Camellia and
Shacal-2 using the methodology described in Section 3.
4.1 Rijndael
The results regarding complexity evaluation of Rijndael encryption, decryption and
key schedule are reported in Table 1, 2 and 3, respectively. It is interesting to
observe (Table 3) that expansion of the 	 -bit secret key for 256-bit encryption
requires an amount of basic operations which is inversely proportional to  	 . The
number of round keys is equal for the three cases (14) and, with the KeyExpansion
algorithm creating 14 round keys from a 256-bit secret key, their generation costs
less than in the case of 128 or 192-bit ones.
As cited in Section 2.1, some observations can be done in order to improve
Rijndael decryption procedure. We consider two ways to rewrite the InvMix-
Columns trasformation, one from Barreto presented in Section 4.1.3 of [9] and
another proposed in [10] for an integrated desing of Rijndael. Figure 1 reports the
achieved results of the comparison of 256-bit decryption (with 128, 192 or 256-bit
key), by analysing also the two different transformations. Results corresponding to
the decryption with the other possible sizes of block and key are almost identical.
Clearly, the proposed techniques really improve the Rijndael decryption procedure,
thus reducing the hardware complexity and saving operation resource.
Table 1: Rijndael encryption
AND OR shifts (bytes)
128/128 1720 1268 408
128/192 2088 1540 496
128/256 2456 1812 584
192/128 3132 2310 744
192/192 3132 2310 744
192/256 3684 2718 876
256/128 4912 3624 1168
256/192 4912 3624 1168
256/256 4912 3624 1168
Table 2: Rijndael dencryption
AND OR shifts (bytes)
128/128 5176 3860 1272
128/192 6312 4708 1552
128/256 7448 5556 1832
192/128 9468 7062 2328
192/192 9468 7062 2328
192/256 11172 8334 2748
256/128 14896 11112 3664
256/192 14896 11112 3664
256/256 14896 11112 3664
Table 3: Rijndael key schedule
AND OR shifts (bytes)
128/128 340 290 120
128/192 384 288 96
128/256 430 299 84
192/128 630 543 228
192/192 598 431 132
192/256 678 471 132
256/128 986 841 348
256/192 950 703 228
256/256 924 630 168
Figure 1: Different Rijndael decryption procedures
4.2 Camellia
In Table 4 we have reported the results regarding complexity evaluation of Camellia
encryption/decryption procedure. Moreover, we propose also the results (marked
by
  ) of a modification presented in Section C.2.6 of [3]. The P-function of the
SPN-structure can be rewrote requiring an additional variable and 27 bytewise-
XORs instead of 36. From a memory point of view this technique is worse than
the standard one, but the computational cost gets much lower.
Table 4: Camellia encryption/decryption
AND OR shifts (bytes)
128/128 2016 1032 16
128/128
 
1692 870 16
128/192 2680 1376 24
128/192
 
2248 1160 24
128/256 2680 1376 24
128/256
 
2248 1160 24
Results concerning the key schedule are reported in Table 5. In addition, an op-
timization is proposed (marked by   ), which combines the modification discussed
above and a XOR cancellation property described in C.1.3 of [3].
Table 5: Camellia key schedule
AND OR shifts (bytes)
128/128 448 576 352
128/128
 
328 516 352
128/192 720 840 480
128/192
 
580 770 480
128/256 720 840 480
128/256
 
580 770 480
4.3 Shacal-2
Results about Shacal-2 are reported in Table 6, where ”32-bit add.” represents the
addition over 
 ﬂ   	  .
Table 6: Shacal-2
AND OR shifts (bytes) 32-bit add.
Encryption 4864 3328 1536 448
Decryption 4864 3328 1536 640
Key Expan 1536 1536 846 144
5 Comparisons
5.1 Camellia versus Rijndael
Some results regarding the comparison between Rijndael and Camellia are reported
in Figures 2 and 3. In the complexity evaluation the shift operation entails lower
cost in comparison with bytewise-AND/OR, therefore we focus on AND and OR
operations. Considering both encryption/decryption and key schedule, it is possible
to check Camellia’s high speed (see Section 2.2). In particular, the comparison
between hardware performance of Camellia and Rijndael reported in [4] is verified.
For additional details on comparison between Camellia and Rijndael see [13].
Figure 2: Comparison of AND operations
Figure 3: Comparison of OR operations
5.2 Shacal-2 versus Rijndael
Results regarding the comparison between Rijndael and Shacal-2 are presented in
Figures 4, 5 and 6. Concerning the encryption procedure, Rijndael and Shacal-2
need a number of operations of the same order of magnitude, although the former
is slightly better because of the amount of 32-bit additions. The comparison of
the decryption procedures is more difficult. The overall complexity of Shacal-2, in
fact, strongly depends on the actual implementation selected for the 32-bit adder,
making the amount of required operations difficult to evaluate. Key schedule of
Rijndael is much better than that of Shacal-2, Shacal-2 key schedule being quite
expensive due to the use of the 512-bit key.
Figure 4: Rijndael vs Shacal-2 encryption
Figure 5: Rijndael vs Shacal-2 decryption
Figure 6: Rijndael vs Shacal-2 key expansion
5.3 Camellia, Rijndael and Shacal-2
In order to compare Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2, which support different block
size, we consider a 256-bit block and, due to the lack of a specific 256-bit version
of Camellia, we consider to use Camellia on both the 128-bit halves.
As written in 3.1, performance of the direct cipher is considered more im-
portant than that of the inverse (if different). In the following graph (Figure 7),
the amount of bytewise-ANDs, bytewise-ORs, shifts of bytes and 32-bit additions
needed by a 256-bit encryption and key schedule with the three algorithms is pre-
sented.
It is important to notice that the achieved results satisfy NESSIE considerations
about finalists performances as reported in [14]: Camellia turns out to be close to
Rijndael, Shacal-2 is ”quite good” , while Rijndael is ”very good and therefore it
can effectively serve as a benchmark” for other block ciphers.
Figure 7: Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2
6 Conclusions
The paper presents a methodology for the evaluation of the complexity and compu-
tational cost of different block ciphers, in order to achieve independence from the
platforms they are implemented on. An analysis of three of the block ciphers se-
lected by NESSIE is provided: the complexity of Rijndael, Camellia and Shacal-2
is estimated through a ”step by step” analysis. The global amount of basic logical
operations required for encryption and decryption are computed and some compa-
risons are presented.
Achieved results are consistent with other performance comparisons based on
actual cipher implementations reported in literature. In particular, NESSIE con-
siderations about finalists performances are verified: Camellia is close to Rijndael,
Shacal-2 is ”quite good”, while Rijndael is ”very good and therefore it can be ef-
fectively used as a benchmark”.
In conclusion, the presented work could be useful for the evaluation of the
implementation complexity of such algorithms on small processors with limited
processing power and, more in general, for comparison among block ciphers.
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